Cybersecurity Newsletter, September 14 - 20
Qrator

Welcome to the networking and cybersecurity newsletter! 
Let's take a look at the interesting articles and repositories published between September 14 and 20, 2020.

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Cybersecurity Newsletter, September 7 - 13
Qrator

Let's take a look at the most relevant materials published between September 7 and 13, 2020.

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The 2020 National Internet Segment Reliability Research
Reports

 

The National Internet Segment Reliability Research explains how the outage of a single Autonomous System might affect the connectivity of the impacted region with the rest of the world. Most of the time, the most critical AS in the region is the dominant ISP on the market, but not always.

As the number of alternate routes between AS’s increases (and do not forget that the Internet stands for “interconnected network” - and each network is an AS), so does the fault-tolerance and stability of the Internet across the globe. Although some paths are from the beginning more important than others, establishing as many alternate routes as possible is the only viable way to ensure an adequately robust network.

The global connectivity of any given AS, regardless of whether it is an international giant or regional player, depends on the quantity and quality of its path to Tier-1 ISPs.

Usually, Tier-1 implies an international company offering global IP transit service over connections with other Tier-1 providers. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that such connectivity will be maintained all the time. For many ISPs at all “tiers”, losing connection to just one Tier-1 peer would likely render them unreachable from some parts of the world.

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Cybersecurity Newsletter, August 31 - September 6
Qrator

Welcome to the regular networking and cybersecurity newsletter! With this letter, it is all about the most exciting articles published between August 31 and September 6, 2020.

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(Yet another one) CenturyLink BGP incident and the blinking Internet
Radar

On Sunday, August 30, 2020, it all started with a simple question: “What’s happening?”

A downdetector.com screenshot at the beginning of the incident

Approximately around 10 UTC, the global Internet started experiencing a very specific state of connectivity - inside the network of one of the largest Tier-1 operators in the world, CenturyLink (primary AS3356), something bad was undoubtedly going on.

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Cybersecurity Newsletter, August 24 - 30
Qrator

Welcome to the regular networking and cybersecurity newsletter! This time we are taking a look at the articles and materials published between August 24 and 30, 2020.

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AS42910 leaking hundreds of prefixes, affecting Akamai and Western Asia region
Radar

Yesterday, on August 24, 2020, Qrator.Radar BGP monitoring saw a rather large route leak originating from the AS42910 - Premier DC, containing 1403 prefixes mainly from the United States (571) and, peculiarly, Akamai. And then almost all the Western Asia region countries.

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Cybersecurity Newsletter, August 17 - 23
Qrator

Hello and welcome to the regular networking and cybersecurity newsletter brought to you every weekend! This time we are looking at the articles and materials published between August 17 and 23, 2020.

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Cybersecurity Newsletter, August 10 - 16
Qrator

Hello and welcome to the regular networking and cybersecurity newsletter brought to you every weekend by Qrator Labs! This time we are looking at the articles and materials published between August 10 and 16, 2020.

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What is happening with the BY internet segment in terms of BGP and IPv4/IPv6
Radar

Before we start investigating what is happening with the Internet within and outside of Belarus, let us quote a couple of sentences we are repeating in annual National Reliability Research & Report

“Strictly speaking, when the BGP and the world of interdomain routing were in the design stage, the creators assumed that every non-transit AS would have at least two upstream providers to guarantee fault tolerance in case one goes down. However, the reality is different; over 45% of ISP’s have only one connection to an upstream transit provider. A range of unconventional relationships among transit ISPs further reduces reliability. So, have transit ISPs ever failed? The answer is yes, and it happens with some frequency. The more appropriate question is — under what conditions would a particular ISP experience service degradation? If such problems seem unlikely, it may be worth considering Murphy’s Law: “Anything that can go wrong, will.”

Why are we repeating this rather than start with the facts and timesteps as usual? Because this is precisely the case, from our point of view, with Belarus’ internet segment. Let us take a look at two diagrams representing a BGP network of Belarus a month ago, at the beginning of July 2020:

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